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"Things that Lie on the Surface:" 
Modernism, Impersonality, and Emotional 
Inexpressibility 
Generally speaking, it can be said that 
people wish to escape from personality. 
When people are encouraged, as 
happens in a democratic society, to 
believe that they wish "to express 
their personality, n the question at once 
arises as to what their personality is. 
For the most part, if investigated, it 
would be rapidly found that they had 
none. So what would it be that they 
would eventually "express"? And why 
have they been asked to "express" it?-
-Wyndham Lewis, "The Contemporary 
Man 'Expresses His Personality"' (148)1 
In The Art of Being Ruled (1926), Wyndham 
Lewis bluntly dismisses the social ideal of the 
"personality" as a figment of the democratic imaginary. 
In addition to his feverish political distrust of democratic 
ideals, Lewis's rhetoric also casts doubt on the act of 
"expression" in general. While Lewis's disdain for the 
expression of personality and its popular pretense 
of individuality does not directly refer to emotional 
expression, his feelings about the subject are tied 
up within a larger modernist discourse of emotion 
that prescriptively deemed it, in its most ideal and 
59 
Rives 
laudable form, inexpressible. I begin with Lewis here because his critical tracts 
most explicitly unveil the political and cultural logic behind this distrust of emotional 
expression. For Lewis, "expression" is linked not only to the predictable wills of 
a mass populace, but also to the staged outbursts and artificiality he attributed to 
both women and homosexuals. Lewis directs several of his polemics in The Art 
of Being Ruled to certain partners in crime, the "feminist" and the "male-invert" 
or "homo."2 In "The Role of Inversion in the War on the Intellect," an essay that 
also appears in The Art of Being Ruled, he observes that democracy requires "the 
greatest vanity for the greatest number," an imperative that governs "all features 
of emotive life" (216). According to Lewis, this particularly dramatic emotive life 
makes the "'homo' the legitimate child of the 'suffragette"' (218). He credits Oscar 
Wilde, who "possessed to the full the proselytizing zeal that usually goes with sex 
inversion" complete with his "martyrdom, ecstatic recantations, [and] eloquent and 
tear-ful confessions," with most fully perfecting these noxious emotional outbursts 
(214). Given Lewis's yoking of emotional expression to both homosexuality and 
femininity, it follows that a more satisfactory emotion is inexpressibly masculine if 
not fascistic. My point here is not to focus exclusively on Lewis or the modernist 
link between fascist politics and misogyny. I begin with Lewis to suggest that 
this reductive, fascist logic also cloaks some potentially progressive ideas about 
emotion. In general, Lewis's imperative that emotion should not be expressed 
appears in a number of modernist texts with wildly divergent political and cultural 
aims. T.S. Eliot theorizes emotion similarly in his critical writings, which like 
Lewis's, have often been derided by critics as authoritarian and aesthetically 
doctrinaire. In addition to Eliot, I also look to the sculptor Henri Gaudier-Brzeska 
and to Virginia Woolf to demonstrate how this sublimely inexpressible ideal of 
emotion might reinforce both reactionary and progressive political ideals, as 
evidenced by these figures' respective models of emotion as an ideal of masculine 
vorticist achievement, and as a reparative vision of collective empathy. 3 I do not 
want to constellate these figures biographically, but to follow their adherence to 
an ideal of "impersonality," which I argue explicitly attends modernist tracts on 
emotion. 
. . !he .n:1odernist doctrine of impersonality, most famously articulated by T.S. 
Eliot in his cnt1cal essay of 1919, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," addresses 
t.he problem that personality, as a product of humanist individualism, presents for 
literary form. While modernist studies is currently benefiting from a much needed 
reconsideration of the term "impersonality," led by critics such as Tim Dean this 
critical tu~n has yet to consider the explicit connections between imperso~ality 
and emot10~ . lt . h~s also yet to fully trace the genealogy of impersonality outside 
the ~oderrnst tnrnty of Yeats, Eliot, and Pound.4 Similarly, scholars of modernist 
emotion, s~ch as Ch~rles ~lti~ri, have tended to downplay the historical specificity 
of aesthetic modernism in lieu of examining more generalizable features of 
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emotion, creating a picture of modernist emotion that does not include the more 
historical ly specific question of "impersonality."5 
Yet, modernism aside, the word "impersonality" itself is suggestive 
of emotion, most logically, its absence. Although "impersonality" in its more 
general sense has been connected to objectivity and neutrality, I argue here that 
modernist theories of impersonality, authoritarian or otherwise, theorize emotional 
engagement by dismantling the duality between subject and object, inside and 
outside. In doing so, this modernist aestheticization of emotion disables the 
boundaries of the self-contained individual - or what Altieri terms the "romantic 
expressivist notions of identity, notions that emphasize getting in touch with some 
core self and locating basic values in how we make those deep aspects of the self 
articulate" ("Theorizing" 161 ). This distrust of psychology enables novel modes of 
thinking about and understanding emotion not predicated upon the individual self 
("Theorizing" 161). In this essay, I explore more fu lly what it means to aestheticize 
our emotions, or to believe that certain ways of having emotions are simply more 
or less tasteful, more beautiful or ugly, than others. 
Clearly, Lewis's linkage of the term "personality" to disastrous emotional 
outburst implies that a corresponding state of "impersonality" might facilitate a 
more aesthetically palatable form of emotion. If Lewis's distrust of "expression" 
lies in its relation to the democratic ideal of personality and all that it implies, he 
then implicitly aligns the term "impersonality" with a perceived lack of expression.6 
I relate this question of expression to the term "psychology," which I use throughout 
this essay in an attempt to bring together a number of critical discourses, including 
those of humanism as well as critical theories of the self and emotion more 
generally. My intention is not to conflate these concepts, but to emphasize 
their historical and theoretical intersections. In general, I term the version of 
individualism Eliot confronts in his essay "psychology," primarily for the purpose 
of arguing that the critical writings of numerous modernists sought to disarticulate 
emotion, both aesthetically and more generally, from individual psychology. 
In making the claim that modernists rejected the connection between 
the ability to have emotions and a unified self or psychology, I borrow from 
a number of discourses. First, my use of the term "psychology" reflects the 
modernist critique of humanism, a concept that, according to Frederic Jameson, 
equates individualism with "consciousness as such," particularly as it "purports 
to characterize the inner climate of the liberated individual and his relation to 
his own being ."7 This self-consciousness, a product of modernity, contributes 
to the habit of forming "anthropological association[s]" that centralize subjects 
in terms of egos, psychologies, and subjectivities.8 For modernist critics such 
as T.E. Hulme, humanism is bound to a "conception of personality," a "new 
psychology, or anthropology" characterized by "a temper or disposition of mind 
which can(not] look at a gap or chasm without shuddering" (6, 61 ). Humanism 
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is a mantra, whose "fundamental error is that of placing Perfection in humanity, 
thus giving rise to that bastard thing Personality, and all the bunkum that follows 
from it" (33). The emotional shudder Hulme identifies reflects a prefabricated, 
copycat form of personality, a "new psychology" where emotion exists only in 
the realm of expression (33). This logic, which imagines human personality 
as a psychological ideal of unfathomed depths and recesses, reifies emotional 
expression and renders it meaningless. In contrast, the modernist texts I examine 
here theorize emotion as a collective phenomenon that is not necessarily related 
to an individual psychology. Rather, such emotion gains intensity only in the 
absence of expression. 
Secondly, the rather pervasive modernist irritation with personality and 
the democratic sacralization of what Hulme terms "humanifY' coincides with 
the widespread modernist distrust of "psychologism." According to Martin Jay 
"psychologism" was the result of an "unprecedented preoccupation with the interio~ 
landscape of the subject, a no longer self-confident self functioning with increased 
difficulty.in t~e larger world outside its threatened and vulnerable boundaries" (93). 
Developing its own attendant set of laws and associations for interpreting the 
human subjec.t, thi.s modern self-consciousness and self-reflexivity became a key 
source of anxiety in the development of aesthetic modernism (93). Jay offers a 
largely philosophical overview of anti-psychologism's evolution, discussing figures 
such as Kant, Husserl, and Hulme and their criticisms of the developing sciences of 
~sychology. H~we~er, Ja~ suggests that T.S. Eliot, in his debt to Hulme, most fully 
incorporated this distrust into aesthetic modernism in his ardent promulgation of 
"anti~p~ychologic~l.argu.ments" (~8). The arguments Jay identifies consist mostly 
of Eliot s famous Injunctions against the personality, which I will discuss more fully 
l~ter !n the essay. However, Jay does not look closely enough at the terms of Eliot's 
d1sm1ssal of personal expression, particularly when he states that the poet "could 
be.see~ a~ ~hampioning self-reflexivity and self-absorption,· in which the aesthetic 
object is ng1dly segregated from anything outside its apparent boundaries" (101 ). 
~nstead, I su.ggest ~ere that Eliot's theory of impersonality, and his corresponding 
ideal of ~oet1c emot1~n, enables both subject and object to escape their respective 
boundaries. If anything, an "anti-psychological" argument would be dismissive of 
self-reflex.ivity. In ~eneral, however, the logical-critical tendency is to suggest that 
a mo?errnst aversion to "psychology" signals a corresponding modernist dislike of 
emotion as such. 
Charles Altieri, in ''Theorizing Emotions in Eliot's Poetry and Poetics," 
more clearly elaborates how an ideal of emotion in modernist tracts might act 
as an a~sthetic alternative to what Jay terms "psychologism." Indeed, without 
referencing the term explicitly, Altieri adds an important dimension to the term 
"psycholog( a~ I use it her~ .. With?ut being historically specific, particularly to 
the modernist time frame, Alt1en credits Eliot with fashioning an "alternative model 
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of affective life" in response to the "dominant ways of representing and valuing 
emotions" (151 ). He mentions the "received renderings of emotional life," which 
contribute to the corresponding notions of psychology and humanism I evoke here: 
a narrative or causal understanding of one's self or ego, identity as determined by 
how fully (actively or passively) one surrenders to emotion, a presumed tension 
between emotion and reason, and finally, the debate over the kinds of values 
"we attribute .. . to our emotional states" (157). While each of these criteria will not 
necessarily appear as salient features of my argument, they posit a core concept 
of self that experiences emotion, and secondly, a singular individual that is the 
repository of that emotion. 
, Because of its long-standing connection to the kind of "romantic 
expressivist" identity Altieri identifies, emotion has not, until recently, been a popular 
subject of social theory. Contemporary popular culture often sensationalizes 
emotions, connecting them to the self-revelatory sentimental confessions 
performed on daytime talk shows. Such venues predicate emotions on the 
presumption of intense individuality, where one's emotions generally reveal what 
it means to "be oneself." Generally, these emotions are connected to a number of 
specific actions or psychic processes; we are often repressing, denying, dealing 
with, or accepting our emotions, or attempting to liberate them from some secret 
inner dwelling to finally be "in touch" with them. This link between emotion and 
popular belief in individual uniqueness and sanctity not only explains Wyndham 
Lewis's disillusionment with the act of "expression," but also accounts for the post-
structuralist suggestion that emotions are merely behavior, products of culture, 
socialization, and discourse.9 Literary studies in particular, with its emphasis on 
the social contexts of literature, has tended to overlook the question of emotion 
as though it is unrelated to social and historical formations. In many i nst~nces , 
this overt historical focus amounts to an attempt to legitimize literary studies as 
concretely reflective of social and historical reality, what really "matters" in the real 
world. As Charles Altieri remarks concerning his interest in the emotions, "I had 
always hated criticism that preferred context to text and insisted on situating works 
in relation to historical forces and sociopolitical interests" (Particulars 1 ). However, 
a number of theorists, including Altieri , have recently begun to re-examine the 
nature of emotions and their relevance for social theory, as books on topics such 
as affect, intimacy, empathy, shame, care, and even terror now occupy prom in~nt 
positions within the oeuvre of social and cultural theory .10 Without addressing 
emotions directly, critics such as Tim Dean have challenged the 
11
insiste.nt 
"rhetoricalist" view that sexuality must be understood as a product of rheto~1c , 
discourse, culture, history, and social relations" in order to resist the "cons~rvat1ve 
notion that sex is grounded in nature" (Beyond Sexuality 176).11 Dean art1cu la~es 
an alternative to the pressure he identifies, using the term "intractable" to describe 
the "non-symbolic real" that transcends the idea of sexuality as a "sophisticated 
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form of voluntarism/' which, he argues, is encouraged by the notion of sex or 
gender as solely discursively constituted (177). Similarly, in the modernist texts 
I examine, emotion is neither discursively constituted through behavior nor is it a 
feature of psychology, selfhood or individuality. These texts refuse to reify emotion 
as pre-given, existing prior to its surface presence; emotions are more "real" when 
they cannot be collated, organized, interpreted or expressed. Rather, emotions 
exist as surfaces, extending beyond the individual to a much larger, impersonal 
human consciousness. 
Poetry's Emotional Concentrate: T.S. Eliot and Impersonality 
To more concretely elaborate upon this modernist version of emotion 
and its relation to impersonality, I now turn to T.S. Eliot and his oft-invoked essay, 
"Tradition and the Individual Talent." First published in 1919, the essay, which 
Eliot later termed "juvenile," speaks of depersonalization as a productive factor in 
literary tradition, counter-intuitively recasting the humanist critique of an impersonal 
and alienating modernity in the service of art and tradition.12 That is, from Eliot's 
vi~wpoint, the very depersonalization implied by an impersonal aesthetic practice 
might overcome the fiction of individuality in modern society by leading back to 
the world of art, or tradition, itself. It is important here not to conflate the terms 
im~er~?nality and de~ersonalization. For Eliot, depersonalization is a process by 
which art may be said to approach the condition of science" (40). It is the actual 
"self-sacrifice," the "continual extinction of personality" from which impersonality 
emerges (40). 
. . . ~ike Lewis's and Hulme's, Eliot's distrust of modernity and bourgeois 
ind1v1duallty fastens to the term "personality." Overall, Eliot demonstrates a 
greater fait~ than ~oes Lewis in .the ability of aesthetics to challenge the sway 
o~ personality, which compels him to contemplate "the poet's difference from 
his .predecess?rs" (38). For Lewis, whatever "impersonality" might appear in 
social. expression - for ~xample, when a person "expresses" his personality by 
adopting someone else s - does not dissolve personality, but rather reiterates it 
throu~h ?onformity. Furthermore, Lewis excoriates "personality" because it entails 
sub~rnss1on to the "group," and any desire to "escape" it inspires only the "crudest 
selfishness" (Art 148). Ironically, Eliot advocates poetic "impersonality" in similar 
terms, but "escape from personality" enables its bearer to understand what it 
mean~ to have on~ a~d to inhabit a greater medium "in which expressions and 
experiences ~ombme in _Peculiar and unexpected ways" (42-43). The true artist 
understands impersonality when she or he joins the "group rhythm" of an order 
of dead poets through a "continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment" 
~4~) . !~personality n~?essitates .self-effacement; for Eliot, the artist must engage 
in continual self-sac.nf1ce, a con~mual extinction of personality" (40). 
Because this theory of impersonality ostensibly appears to reinforce the 
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value of tradition over novelty, many critics have aligned it with the high-modernist 
authoritarianism often attributed to figures like Eliot, Lewis, and Pound, especially 
in terms of their later flirtations with fascism. Furthermore, feminist critics have 
interpreted the paradigm as promoting a neutrality and objectivity that nullifies the 
intense emotion they attribute to the more "experimental" work of women writers of 
the period. For example, Cassandra Laity's H.D. and the Victorian Fin de Siecle, 
affil iates the poet H.D. with the aesthetic decadence of Oscar Wilde while reducing 
impersonality to a masculine, "non-sexual poetic of gender-neutral images" that 
resists desire and prohibits "narrative strategies that might allow for a female 'I"' 
(42). In contrast, I emphasize the potential of impersonal strategies for women's 
writing , arguing that intellectuals such as Virginia Woolf employ the same ~odel 
of impersonality as their masculine counterparts to explore structures of emotional 
attachment and empathy. As I will argue more thoroughly in what follows, Virginia 
Woolf, whether deliberately or unconsciously, extended and often complicated the 
same ideas about impersonality, emotion, and expression that Eliot promulgated 
in his doctrinal literary criticism. In doing so, she disturbs the binary created by 
Lewis's critical affronts to femininity and democratic idealism. 
Among the classic accounts of modernist impersonality is Maud 
Ellman n's The Poetics of Impersonality: T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, which helped 
to establish high-modernism as staunchly doctrinaire and anti-democratic. In ~er 
discussion of the term, Ellmann rightly argues that Eliot resurrected the doctrine 
of impersonality for modernism as a "crusade against Romantic individualism in 
society" (5). Though Ellmann's formalist readings of Pound's and Eliot's pee.try 
are often riveting, her failure to historicize impersonality more broadly explains 
her assertion at the end of the book that the words '"impersonal' and 'personal' 
have probably outlived their usefulness" (197). Impersonality, she argues, 
"was born conservative" (198). For Pound, as Ellmann provocatively sugge~ts, 
impersonality "opens up the whole psychopathology of fascism" (199~. By end1~g 
on this dismissive note, however correct, Ellmann abandons the radical potential 
of what her pointed criticism often unveils. Her reading of .Eliot's ":h.~ .Love 
Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" in particular highlights the more radical poss1b1ht1es of 
impersonality, as she sees it bound up in the oxymoronic authoritarian control the 
poem's diffuse yellow fog, "remorseless and impersonal," exercises over Prufrock, 
intensifying his "general unease of otherness" (69). If the "yellow fog" of the ~o~m 
surrounds Prufrock in the ultimate impersonal relationship, that fog can signify 
anything from the complete dissolution to the "apotheosis of the self," depending 
on whether Prufrock experiences it as intrusive or as part of himself, which wo~ld 
be much more radical (69). The fog's threat to Prufrock's personal boun?anes 
reflect the "interiorizing" gestures of the impersonal poem that, according to 
Ellmann, enable both "self-love" and "self-oblivion," where "the other always takes 
the subject by surprise," reflecting the emotive aspects of an impersonality bound 
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up with the "vagaries of 'love'" (68, 71 ). While Prufrock attempts to defend himself 
~rom the assaults of the voyeuristic other, evident in his fear of "eyes that fix you 
in a formulated phrase," the ideal state of impersonality would result from his 
submission to it {Eliot "Prufrock" 5). 
Several critics, including Tim Dean, have attempted to save impersonality 
from the .conseq~e~~.es of Ell~ann's critical censure by investigating these more 
progressive P?s~1b111l1t1es . Arguin~ that most misconceptions about impersonality 
stem from Eliot s own contradictory and ambivalent pronouncements on the 
su~ject," inclu?i~g his focus on the mask as a tool for concealment, Dean 
?la1ms" that ~l1ot s t~eory ins!ead enables "access" rather than "evasion" and 
1~ an . expenme~t with self-dispossession rather than self-advancement," thus 
disputing th~ ~la1m th~~ the doctrine of impersonality is necessarily authoritarian 
(4~, 
1
51). S1m1larly, cnt1.cs .su~h as David Chinitz have also sought to demystify 
Eliot s presumed authontanarnsm by reading popular song as a conduit of emotion 
~hat shapes Eliot's conceptions of love and sexual attachment. Chinitz's essay, 
In th~ Shadows: Popul~,r Son~ and Eliot's Construction of Emotions," argues 
that, 1~ P?ems. such as Portrait of a Lady," Eliot employs popular song as a 
n~rrat1ve intrusion that "assails" the speaker's "self-possession" and aloofness 
h~s "apparently secure distinction from ordinary people and their emotions. " 1~ 
d1s!u.rb1~g th~ sp~aker's boundaries of self-containment, the ideal of emotion 
9h1rn~ 1dent1fies is str~~turally similar to the "poetic emotion" Eliot presents in 
Trad.1t10~ an.d th~. lnd1v1?~al Talent." However, Eliot more explicitly theorizes 
emot~on in 
11
h1s cnt1~al wnt1.ngs,. ~nd. wh~le this version of emotion does promote 
the. k.m? of acc.ess Dean 1dent1f1es in his account of impersonality, it complicates 
Chmitz s ~ppra1sal of the role of popular song in generating emotion, since that 
access still on~y exten~s to t~e select few, the "poets" whose mastery of the craft 
grants them th1.s affect1v~ achievement. "Tradition" more explicitly defines emotion 
as an aesthetic necessity, reached through rigorous self-abandonment rather 
than the result of a random popular intrusion. ' 
. . . Indeed, modernists such as Pound more directly characterize emotion as 
disc1?11,~a~ and. aes.~hetic, ~articularly in his claim that "[e]motion is an organiser of 
form. (,Affirmations 350~. Pound's meaning gains concreteness in the context 
of Eliot s though~s. about impersonality and poetic emotion, which converge more 
clearly and expl1c1tly at the end of "Tradition and the Individual Talent" where 
he m~re fully elaborates his concept of poetic emotion. Because the~e terms 
are shpp~~, I refer t? ::poetic emotion" and impersonality separately, in such a 
way that imp.ersonahty com~ri~es the larger rubric that defines poetic emotion. 
'.urthermor~: in r~ference t.o Eliot s ideal of impersonality, poetic emotion should be 
imperso~al, in th1~ ~en~e, impersonality is also a characteristic of poetic emotion. 
!hese kinds of d1~tmct1ons .become even more complicated and difficult as Eliot 
introduces the topic of emotion by desc~~ng the poet's mind as a type of catalyst 
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that remains "inert," "neutral," and "unaffected" in the presence of two elements: 
"emotions and feelings" (41 ). Eliot does not explicitly distinguish between "feeling" 
and "emotion," but treats them as separate categories: 
The effect of a work of art upon the person who enjoys it is an experience 
different in kind from any experience not of art. It may be formed out of 
one emotion, or may be a combination of several; and various feelings, 
inhering for the writer in particular words or phrases or images, may be 
added to compose the final result. Or great poetry may be made without 
the direct use of any emotion whatever: composed out of feelings, solely. 
Canto XV of the Inferno (Brunetto Latini) is a working up of the emotion 
evident in the situation ... (41 ) 
Judging from this passage, Eliot distinguishes feelings from emotion, but he does 
not explain the nature of that difference. However, the lines that follow suggest 
that whereas feeling attaches itself personally to the poet, emotion develops from 
the artistic process itself. In other words, feeling, which enters the poet's mind 
and aids the creative process, is a means to emotion as an end. As such, the 
two concepts, feeling and emotion, function dialectically rather than oppositionally. 
For Eliot, emotion is the end product of a process of "transmutation," in that: "In 
the Agamemnon, the artistic emotion approximates to the emotion of an actual 
spectator; in Othello, to the emotion of the protagonist itself'(44). In no way does 
this emotion have an individual referent, such as the poet. Because this form of 
emotion is free from a relation to causality or origin, it supports Altieri's claim that 
Eliot's theorizes emotion outside of its conventional narratives of selfhood and 
identification. 
While the poet himself helps generate poetic emotion, according to Eliot, 
he must ultimately remain detached from the final product as "[i]mpressions and 
experiences which are important for the man may take no place in the poetry" (42). 
This is not to say that these personal factors are not important. Eliot distinguishes 
"ordinary," psychological emotions from poetic emotion, which involve "feelings 
which are not in actual emotions at all" (43). While his terminology is a bit 
confusing here, these "feelings which are not in actual emotions at all" are 
poetic emotion. They are not "actual" in that they are not related to individual, 
personal "[i]mpressions and experiences (42) ." Thus, "personal emotion," or "the 
emotions provoked by particular events in [a poet's] life, is a necessary catalyst of 
poetic, impersonal emotion, even though no trace of the earlier form of emotion 
should appear in the latter, extra-psychological state. I use the term "extra-
psychological" rather than "anti-psychological" to describe a dialectical process 
that does not altogether disregard individual psychology, what is "personal," but 
uses it to catalyze an impersonal state that extends beyond psychology. In this 
sense, following the same kind of relationship Eliot envisions between feeling 
1 and emotion, the individual self is not totally annihilated, but transformed into a 
different medium. In defining poetic emotion as both extra-psychological and 
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impersonal but dependent on the boundedness of individual psychology in the first 
place, Eliot's ideal emotive state combines the fluid otherness of Prufrock's poetic 
fog with concentrated mathematical precision. Poetic emotion is, explicitly, 
a concentration, and a new thing resulting from a number of experiences 
which to the practical and active person would not seem to be experiences 
at all; it is a concentration which does not happen consciously or of 
deliberation (43). 
According to Eliot's logic, emotion is singular, concentrated, and 
amenable to order because of its role in uniting a cacophony of experiences 
- much like a less violent version of Pound's vortex.14 In likening poetic emotion 
to a "concentration," Eliot's counter-intuitive claim is that emotion moves outward, 
away from psychology as an interpretive depth model of selfhood in a form that 
cannot be expressed, recollected, collated or analyzed. Each of these actions 
only reconstitutes the self and the individual that impersonality purportedly 
dissolves, thus enabling another point of coherence between Eliot's and Lewis's 
disapprobation of people's wish to 11express their personality" (Lewis 148). 
Despite this absolute imperative that personal experience should not enter the 
realm of artistic production, Eliot's theory of impersonality and poetic emotion 
does demonstrate the necessity of safeguarding a version of the individual, 
because, however unconscious or lacking in deliberation, emotions and creative 
acts still grow out of individual initiative. Nonetheless, Eliot's partial respect for the 
boundaries of individuality is tied up in his understanding of form and tradition. A 
poet who gives up his or her individual personality to inherit a "particular medium" 
submits to a greater sense of tradition that dissolves his or her singularity. This 
impersonal process of de-individuation seemingly posits tradition as an engulfing 
imperative, offering little room for experimentation or novel inventions in literary 
form. However, by maintaining the importance of individuality as a catalyst in the 
impersonal poetic process, Eliot manages to synthesize his respect for the new 
with the old, where the new is synonymous with the individual. The creation of a 
11
new work of art" modifies the order of "existing monuments:" 
for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing 
order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, 
values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted; and this is a 
conformity between the old and the new (32). 
This particular order, or 
11
conformity between the old and the new," maps onto the 
dialectical relation Eliot imagines between personal and poetic emotion. While 
personal emotion, the emotion related to the individual's particular experiences, is 
essential in creating poetic emotion, only the smallest trace of it remains in the final 
product. In this way, Eliot promotes poetic emotion as a collective phenomenon 
that resists individualizing psychology or subjectivity at the same time that it holds 
the boundaries of individuality intact. Without this synthesis, the very parameters 
of poetry as an individualized form would disappear within the universalizing 
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impulse of collective emotion.15 
Eliot both appears to solve this intellectual quandary and unleash .the 
radical potential of his theory of emotion by .descr.ibi~1g it as a ... c~ncentrat10~" that does not "happen consciously or of deliberation (43). Significantly, this 
impersonal conception of emotion doe~ not depend o.n the idea of s~ared. personal 
experiences or exhaustive self-revelation .. lnst~ad, 1t ~llows us to ~m~gine forms 
of emotional connection that do not solidify 1dent1ty or difference. El.1ot ~ ~se ~f the 
term 11concentration" is particularly crucial in describing a form of ind1v1duallty or 
difference that does not accord with commonly held ideas of identity and selfhood. 
Additionally, the process of concentration implies ~ spatial movement bo~h to 
the inside and outside, which disturbs the boundaries between protected inner 
emotional space and external bodily surface. To conce~trate means to r~duce 
a number of common factors to their simplest and most intense element without 
altering the particular composition of each one. In this process, however, the 
whole takes on a new composition. . . 
The concentration we see here also conforms to what Eliot designates as 
11the new" and the individual (38). In more general terms, this sense of newness. or 
individuality could stand in for a number of designations, such as.ge~der, sexuality, 
or race, that relate to personal experience. Therefore, despite its ~omage. to 
tradition and poetic doctrine, Eliot's theory of impersonality and ~oet1~ emot10~ 
offers a way of imagining emotional connections that transcend. the 1dent1ty of their 
participants. Thus, it offers a radical form of emotional connect10~ that.transcends 
the boundaries of humanistic ideals of selfhood, psychology, and 1dent1t~. Further, 
this particular emotional register does not dismiss personal experience and 
identity altogether. Rather, it takes the form of a collective forum or 
11
me~iu~': that 
resists individual psychology but which also emerges from the trace .of ind1v1dual 
experience. This miniaturist trace of individualized structure. fu.nct1ons beyond 
psychology, allowing one to express the "grains" ?f diff~rence w1th~n an abstra~ted 
impersonal space. Since this emotional plane 1s ant1-psycholog1c~I, not .subject 
to interpretive narratives of individual development or expression, it provides ~n 
alternative to the conventional, anthropomorphic humanism both Hulme and ~ewis 
denigrate. For the purposes of critical theory, this impersonal ~nderstandm~ of 
emotion allows one to both confront a poststructuralist de-centering of th~ subject 
that reads human depth and affect as constructed fictions ~t the same time that 
it refuses to center the subject as a repository of psycho log 1cal. dept.h that can be 
interpreted, collated, or analyzed. Since this impersonal emot1~nahty addresses 
the question of depth it is can also be interpreted as a spatial phenomenon. 
' fl tt " ressed" The process of "concentration" Eliot outlines narrows, even a ens exp 
or psychological forms of emotion. Because this emotion does not apply t.0 a 
centralized subject that can be the source of study, expression, or interpre~ati?n, 
it occasions a movement in space that disturbs the barriers that separate inside 
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from outside. The poetic emotional interior exists externally, and vice-versa. 
Accordingly, Eliot's poetic emotion can be thought of as a surface or plane that 
enables collective emotional experience. 
An "Arrangement of Surfaces:" Gaudier·Brzeska's "Sculptural Feeling" 
I SHALL DERIVE MY EMOTIONS SOLELY FROM THE 
ARRANGEMENT OF SURFACES, I shall present my emotions by 
the ARRANGEMENT OF MY SURFACES, THE PLANES AND LINES 
BY WHICH THEY ARE DEFINED-Gaudier-Brzeska (qtd. in Pound 
Memoir 27-28)16 
I now turn to a modernist figure whose critical writings even more literally 
concretize the version of emotion Eliot articulated in "Tradition and the Individual 
Talent," the young modernist sculptor, Henri Gaudier-Brzeska. Given Gaudier-
Brzeska's death in 1915, his work actually pre-dates "Tradition and the Individual 
Talent." I am not concerned here with whether Eliot had any knowledge of Gaudier-
Brzeska's letter from the trenches of World War I, which I analyze more closely 
in what follows, but with how the sculptor's manifestic declarations about emotion 
capture both its progressive potential as well as its fascistic downside, as the 
relation between an aesthetics of emotion and an aesthetics of fascism becomes 
quite clear in the young artist's thoughts about emotion. In his essay, '"Surrounded 
by a Multitude of Other Blasts': Modernism and the Great War/' Paul Peppis 
explains exactly how Gaudier-Brzeska's death provided the "ultimate authorization 
of Vorticist collaboration and resistance" while cementing the "demise of the defiant 
soldier-artist" to what has become "fascist modernism" (61 ,62). According to 
Peppis, vorticists mythologized the young sculptor's death as a means of fulfilling 
the movement's own "contradictory doctrine," where the soldier's "destruction is 
the final validation of his cause" (62). I would argue that this contradictory logic 
offers a more extreme articulation of the contradictions in Eliot's "Tradition and the 
Individual Talent." The vorticist "celebration of annihilation as the fullest proof of 
manly life" not only "anticipates what has come to be called fascist modernism," 
as Peppis rightly claims, it also functions as the reactionary arm of Eliot's doctrine 
(62). While Gaudier-Brzeska does not mention the term explicitly, his conception 
of emotion is bound up within this same concept of aesthetic impersonality that 
Eliot wo.uld . later articulate, where aesthetic disinterestedness and personal 
obfuscation 1s a necessary precondition for creating an emotionally connected 
artistic community. 
. Ezra '.ound's A Memoir of Gaudier-Brzeska, first published in 1916, 
mourns its subject, the young French sculptor who died in the trenches of World 
War I at age 23, "as part of the war waste" (17). The memoir itself is a concrete 
manifestation of the paradox Vorticism supports, where the annihilation of the 
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young soldier is memorialized as the ultimate aesthetic achievement. In this 
homage, the poet counts the sculptor's work as, more so than contempora~ 
painting, "peculiarly a thing of the twentieth-century" (29). "Sculp~ure , ?~ this 
new sort " he adds is "more moving than painting" because of its ability to 
create a~ "austere ~ermanence" with "some relation of life and yet outsid~ it" 
(29). In ascribing this feature to Gaudier-Brzeska's sculpt.ure, Po~nd describ~s 
a relationship that pre-dates and foregrounds the poetic emotion T.S .. E~1ot 
would later theorize in "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919). In ascribing 
emotion to different works of art, Pound implicitly suggests that sculpture is more 
"emotional" than painting because it is a multi-dimensional .surface t~at fl~ttens 
the distinction between inside and outside. While sculpture 1s three-d1mens1onal, 
it simultaneously has no depth, no psychology. Rather, the "arrangement" of 
its exterior surfaces, or flat planes, comprises its totality. Of course, Pound's 
conclusion is both counter-intuitive and paradoxical, since painting is generally 
considered more "flat" than the three-dimensional volume of sculpture. Gaudier-
Brzeska, as Hugh Kenner explains in The Pound Era, also saw ~culpture as an 
"expression of certain emotions," but only in so much as th.e work did not r~s~mbl.e 
his actual subject, as in his famous sculpture, produced in . 1913 ~ of the H1erat1c 
Head of Ezra Pound" (256). This conception of sculpture 1s an 1mperso~al one, 
in that it conceals the actual person, the physical characteristics that contribute to 
an identity, in favor of a more general form of emotion present in t~e cold ,~lanes 
of stone. "You understand it will not look like you, it will ... not ... look like you, wrote 
Gaudier-Brzeska. "It will be the expression of certain emotions which I get from 
your character" (quoted. in Kenner 256). Here, character should not be confused 
with personality or identity. Rather, in keeping with Eliot's ter~s . character appears 
to be an aspect of the "personal" that might be transformed into a more abstract, 
generalizable aesthetic unity, or form. . , 
In his letter, "Written from the Trenches," which appears in ~ound s 
memoir, Gaudier-Brzeska appears to be working though the ~ame kinds of 
distinctions, if in different terminology, between personal emotion, . as rel~ted 
to one's individual experience, and a more impersonal form of poetic emotion. 
Ironically, the essay, originally handwritten in a combination of 1.ow~r- ~n.d up~er­
case scripts, enunciates its message in a staccato format of obJect1~e lnJUn~t1ons 
that ostensibly appear to chastise emotion rat~~r than embrace 
11
1t. ~h1le he 
appears to be defining sculpture as merely an ARRANGEME~T or SIMPLE 
COMPOSITION OF LINES AND PLANES," he is also presenting a theory of 
aesthetic emotion that paradoxically hinges on his callous d isrespe~t for human 
lives (Memoir 28). Indeed, the essay definitely solidifies the connection ?etween 
modernist intellectual elitism and fascist authoritarianism by asserting that 
"THIS WAR IS A GREAT REMEDY," having taken "AWAY FROM THE MASSES 
NUMBERS UPON NUMBERS OF UNIMPORTANT UNITS, WHOSE ECONOMIC 
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ACTIVITIES BECOME NOXIOUS AS THE RECENT TRADE CRISES HAVE 
SHOWN US" (28). In its unfathomably crude and utilitarian vision of the world 
and art as an efficiently functioning machine that must eradicate "UNIMPORTANT 
UNITS," one cannot overlook the connection between such a statement and the 
latter fascist leanings of figures such as Pound, Eliot, and Yeats. Again, far from 
conveying emotion, this statement appears to reflect cold disengagement from the 
surrounding human environment. 
Nonetheless, the sculptor's thoughts can offer alternative routes for 
thinking about emotion, which, as I have argued of T.S. Eliot's "poetic emotion," 
might actually contribute to an impersonal theory of emotion that establishes 
collective emotional bonds that exist outside of shared personal experience and 
identity. This possibility is more evident in the sculptor's stark admission that within 
"the chaos of battle," which does not "ALTER IN THE LEAST the outlines of the 
hill we are besieging ... IT WOULD BE FOLLY TO SEEK ARTISTIC EMOTIONS 
AMID THESE LITTLE WORKS OF OURS" (27). Much like Eliot, the sculptor 
professes his disbelief that individual emotions, desires and aspirations could 
affect his turbulent surroundings, which are ironically and imperturbably anchored 
by the earth's natural surface, the hills around him. However the machinations 
of war might literally sculpt the earth, through "volleys, wire entanglements, 
projectors, motors" and most importantly, the digging of trenches themselves, its 
surface remains unphased by these human actions (27). Accordingly, individual 
artistic emotions are also "folly," and Guadier-Brzeska counts the war itself as 
integral in killing the "ARROGANCE, SELF-ESTEEM, [and] PRIDE," all "personal" 
char~cteristics, that have contributed to its own furrowing of the earth (27). War 
functions on two levels, both as a leveler of humanity's overall ignorance and 
arrogance and as an index of humanity's stupidity. Gaudier-Brzeska's idea of 
"artistic emotion" runs parallel to this latter function of war. According to Gaudier-
Brzeska, an artist's belief that artistic or personal emotion can produce a true 
aesthetic medium is as foolish as faith that man's battle will somehow alter the 
earth's impermeability. 
. As .an alternative to the ineffectiveness of artistic emotion, the sculptor 
outlines an ideal of emotion that exhibits no pretense to "ARROGANCE, SELF-
~STEEM, .[or] PRIDE" (27). This statement parallels Wyndham Lewis's similar 
tirade against personality, where personality is characterized by "vanity" that 
"governs all features of emotive life" (Art 214). In opposition to this personal model 
of a self characterized by a complex accretion of motivation and experience 
~motions "p.res~nt" themselves on an arrangement of surfaces, so that depth itself 
is only an 1llus1on. Similarly, Gaudier-Brzeska refers to the "ARRANGEMENT 
?F. M': SU~FAC~S" as the means by which he "present[s]" his own emotions, 
1nd1cat.mg his belief that he is not a psychologically three-dimensional being 
comprised of secret depths and recesses (28). Like Wyndham Lewis in The Art of 
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Being Ruled, he distrusts "expression." His emotions are not expressed, but rather 
"present[ed]" as surface phenomena that confuse any distinction between inside 
and outside. In stating that emotions are more accurately "presented" or "defined" 
through an objectively precise arrangement of surfaces, Gaudier-Brzeska denies 
the possibility of a self that exists prior to their expression. Rather, the sculptor 
counts emotions as always and already on the surface. As with Eliot's concept of 
impersonality and poetic emotion, Gaudier-Brzeska's dictum effectively erases the 
meaning of a self or identity in determining emotive life. 
Both figures posit emotion as a collective phenomenon, an abstract 
aesthetic medium that diminishes the importance of individual aesthetic 
creation. Eliot's understanding of poetic emotion is similar to Gaudier-Brzeska's 
concepts of "[s]culptural energy," "[s]culptural feeling" and "[s]culptural ability," 
which he elaborated in his contributions to the first issue of Wyndham Lewis's 
Blast, originally published in 1913 (155). Rather abstractly, Gaudier-Brzeska 
defines sculptural energy as "the Mountain," whereas "[s]culptural feeling is the 
appreciation of masses in relation," and "[s]culptural ability is the defining of 
these masses by planes" (155). My point here is not to exhaustively distinguish 
between these three modes of "sculptural" activity, but to demonstrate how the 
sculptor conceives each mode as a form of collective relation or engagement, as 
he indicates quite explicitly in his definition of sculptural feeling. Indeed, sculptural 
feeling and ability depends on the existence of an intense empathy that draws 
relations and connections between monuments of sculptural energy. These 
relations are purely immediate. They do not arise from any sense of depth, which 
must be represented or expressed. Rather, the relations between "masses" are 
defined "by planes," flat surfaces, that in their rejection of soul, psychology, and 
selfhood, are never "derivative or secondary" (156). Echoing the imagist tenents 
of Pound and foregrounding Eliot's latter version of poetic emotion, Gaudier-
Brzeska's last paragraph defines the form of impersonal collectivity established 
through sculptural energy, feeling , and activity: 
We have been influenced by what we liked most, each according to his 
own individuality, we have crystallized the sphere into the cube, we have 
made a combination of all the possible shaped masses-concentrating 
them to express our abstract thoughts of conscious superiority (158). 
The "we" Gaudier-Brzeska invokes is not exactly a democratic community but 
a collective assembly of like minds, "the moderns" he affiliates himself with in 
an earlier statement in the essay: "Epstein, Brancusi, Archipenko, Dunikoswki, 
Modigliani" (158). As with Eliot's concept of poetic emotion, individuality is a 
catalyst that only exists residually in the emotional and aesthetic medium it 
produces. Borrowing from imagist rhetoric, Gaudier-Brzeska describes how each 
individuality is "crystallized" from a sphere into a well-defined cube. Whereas 
a sphere is composed of curves, a cube is an "arrangement of surfaces," an 
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assemblage of flat planes that theoretically eradicates depth. Only in this 
arrangement is a collective assembly of like minds possible. As with Eliot's poetic 
emotion, these "possible shaped masses" have been "concentrate[ed]," reduced 
and flattened to an essence that exists both within and without, allowing them to 
realize their "conscious superiority" (158). 
Despite the pretense of this politically unpalatable statement, this model 
of surface and concentration not only informs Eliot's thoughts about poetry and 
emotion, but also appears in a kinder, more empathically and ethically engaged 
type of modernist critical tract. Both Gaudier-Brzeska and Eliot display an 
intellectualized and theoretical, if not programmatic understanding of emotion that 
ostensibly aligns their thoughts with those of Lewis as critical of femininity and its 
relation to emotional expression, theatrical affectation, individuality, and selfhood. 
Likewise, the texts I have examined thus far conceive of an emotion that is both 
anti-humanist in its strong distrust of anthropological associations and impersonal 
in its desire to disable the boundaries of individual selfhood and psychology. As 
both an antithesis to and extension of this ideology of emotion, I now turn to 
Virginia Woolf, who, I argue, drew a more concrete and socially reparative vision 
of the same model of emotion elaborated by Eliot, Lewis, and Gaudier-Brzeska. 
As opposed to the this group's understanding of emotion as a marker of aesthetic 
superiority, Woolf's impersonal ideals extend the scope of humanity itself to 
encompass those who fall outside it, most specifically the deformed and disabled. 
Woolfs understanding of emotion as an ex.tra-psychological surface reworks the 
theory of emotion I have discussed so far by contributing to an anthropology of city 
life that envisions emotion not as the possession of individuals, but as entangled 
networks of care, support, and anonymity. 
Virginia Woolf, Scale, and Emotional Atmospheres 
In particular, I turn to Woolf's essay, "Street Haunting: A London 
Adventure" written in 1930, where the narrator joins "the vast republican army 
of anonymous trampers" that comprises the impersonal yet emotionally engaged 
network of London life (155). Generally, anonymity has been connected to the 
depersonalization of city life, as in Georg Simmel's famous essay, 'The Metropolis 
and Mental Life." Again, I want to distinguish here between impersonality and 
depersonalization. Whereas impersonality exchanges humanist ideals of selfhood 
and individuality for collective emotional and aesthetic presence, Simmel credits 
depersonalization with "the leveling down of the person by the social technological 
mechanism" (409). For Simmel, depersonalization results in a particular set of 
psychological conditions that ostensibly sedates emotionality, most specifically 
a "blase ~ttitude" t~~t reduces the world to a "flat and gray tone" (414). This 
psychol?g1cal c~nd1t1on, as a specific lack of emotionality, quells aesthetic 
perception and hollows out the core of things, their individuality, their specific 
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value, and their incomparability" (414). While Simmel does not mention the word 
emotion explicitly, he does imply that the conditions of metropolitan life and the 
blase indifference they create also threatens the fabric or texture of ·~ unity" that 
can be created by close-knit, emotionally engaged connections. The promise 
of individual and personal freedom granted by the metropolis ultimately wears 
away the "inner unity" of group identity, familial ties, and relig ious affiliation. Thus, 
according to Simmel's logic, the blase indifferent attitude the metropolis engenders 
exists in stark contrast to an emotionally united collective being bound by shared 
identity. 
, In its descriptions of city life, Woolfs essay transcends the binary Simmel 
elaborates - anonymity is a mode of emotional and observational engagement 
, that neither reifies shared experience nor produces a depersonalized state 
of disengagement. Quite famously, Woolf opens her treatise in a moment of 
conventional desire, where she is "set upon having an object," a pencil, which 
operates as a mere guise for the freedom of perpetual movement, of not "having 
an object" (155). The object, however frail in the reality of its existence, occasions 
the movement from an interior architectural space to becoming "part of that vast 
republican army of anonymous trampers" (155). It is easy to slip into reading 
Woolf s words as a salute to the powers of female flaneurie and omniscience or 
conversely, as representative of Woolfs own narratorial intrusion, her slumming 
into the cultural undergrowth that dispels her own experience of privilege. In 
contrast to these two narratives, I read Woolfs observations as creating an 
alternative emotional scale by which she measures the objects of her observation. 
These objects, in their extreme empathy for others, both participate in and create 
that scale. The movements and perpetual reconfigurations of surface and space 
occasioned by Woolf s non-intrusive observations create points of connection that 
emphasize how radical emotional atmospheres of care and empathy exist on the 
surface of things. Woolf s specific style of flaneurie demonstrates how emotional 
registers are glimpsed from the objective stand-point of a casual passerby, not 
interpreted or gleaned by a psychologist of human behavior. . . 
Rather than phenomenological certainty, the rhetoric of Woolf s cruising 
hinges on the term "atmosphere" as the grounds for visual display. Woolfs 
atmosphere assures that scale is often perceived but rarely "fixed" beyond the 
moment of perception. For example, the sudden appearance of a dwarf in the 
essay physically alters the scale of human perception. Escorted into a sh?e 
store by women of normal size, the dwarf, as the marker that lends the space its 
meaning, turns the women into "benevolent giants," while displaying her "perfectly 
proportioned," "arched," and "aristocratic" foot to the shop-girl before her. (157) . 
What occurs is a change in the "angles and relationships" of observation, or 
as Guadier-Brzeska might observe of a similar situation, the "arrangement" of 
"planes" and "surfaces" that create such an atmosphere are re-defined.17 As Woolf 
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so eloquently states, the dwarf had "called into being an atmosphere which, as we 
followed her out into the street seemed actually to create the humped, the twisted 
and the deformed" (158). Such an "atmosphere/' or "arrangement of surfaces/' 
is transient, itinerant, subject to change. This idea of "atmosphere" also stands in 
for the kind of emotion I am describing here, or what Charles Altieri would call a 
"mood/' or mode "of feeling where the sense of subjectivity becomes diffuse and 
sensation merges into something close to atmosphere, something that seems to 
pervade an entire scene or situation" (Particulars 2). In this scene, the dwarf's 
ac~ions a:e not self-contained, but rather influence a whole range of exchanges. 
This particular arrangement is built around a form of emotional engagement a 
kind of "being with" that, neither firmly detached nor resolutely united, collap;es 
t~e binary Simmel envisions between a depersonalized modernity and a united, 
tribal society. That is, the dwarf is powerful only in her attached relation to others. 
The atmosphere she creates, where "the humped, the twisted and the deformed" 
defi~e the scale of normal humanity, only arises through her literal positioning 
beside others. The three are a relaxed unity, an intensely empathic arrangement 
of surfaces that cannot exist independently. 
This atmosphere mirrors the more theoretical version of emotion both 
Eliot a.nd Gaudier-Brzeska articulated earlier, defining a form of engagement 
~hat m1~rors th~ "concentration/' not expression, both figures deem necessary 
m .emot1.on. This collective extra-psychological network of emotion is especially 
evident in the next scene, where Woolf's observation shifts to another threesome 
a company of "[t]wo bearded men, brothers, apparently, stone-blind, supportin~ 
themselves by resting a hand on the head of a small boy between them marched 
down the street" (158). Again, I use the term extra-psychological here t~ describe 
a ~oveme~t that transforms or diffuses identity and self rather than completely 
obllterat~s 1~. Woolf.descri?es this group as a "convoy/' passing by tremulously 
an~. unyieldingly, as if evading the observer's objectification, yet "holding straight 
on in a sense of absolute direction: 
the little conv~y s~emed . to cleave asunder the passers-by with the 
momentum of its silence, its directness1 its disaster. Indeed, the dwarf 
had started a hobbling grotesque dance to which everybody in the street 
had now conformed (159). 
Woolf's use of words such as "convoy/' "cleave/' and "conformed" reinforce the 
sea~less. ~onnections of the "human spectacle" she describes, united by the very 
part1c~lant1es !h~~ attract t~e author's attention in the first place. Her use of the 
~o~d supporting ~~ descn.be the relationship between the two men and the boy 
indicates th~ s~ec1f1c emotional register, or atmosphere, this connected situation 
creates, wh1c~ is not limited to the psychology of one person or the other. The 
three ar~ a unit; th~ boy prosthetically extends the two brothers, creating a surface 
that denies what it means to be an independent emotional being. Rather, the 
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bond of support between this triad derives from their arrangement beside each 
other. Similarly, the men and the boy appear to objectively pass through the 
observer's field of vision, indicating that they have nothing particular to express. 
Neither does the crowd that surrounds them. As with Eliot's poetic impersonality, 
where a concentrated trace of individuality bolsters a collective aesthetic medium, 
the peculiarities of this assemblage create an impersonat extra-psychological 
network that defines emotion in its most modernist sense. 
By the end of the essay, Woolf, echoing Eliot, frames the effects of her 
cruising as an "escape" from "the straight lines of personality ... into the heart 
of the forest where live those wild beasts, our fellow men," as if transcending 
personality offers a heightened aesthetic perception and pleasure that solidifies 
her connection to others (165-6). Much like Lewis, Hulme, Eliot, and Guadier-
Brzeska, the particular style of Woolf's observations points to an impersonal 
version of emotion that displays a profound distrust of the humanistic sciences of 
psychology and personality. In essays of the same time period, such as "Flying 
over London," Woolf seriously considers the limitations of this kind of perspective, 
which grants the individual too much supremacy in defining and perceiving the 
world and in creating engaged social connections. Her aerial voyeurism in the 
essay critiques what is also the target of "Street Haunting," the "inveterately 
anthropocentric ... mind" that creates a "welcoming, accepting" social "harbour" 
for the airplane's imminent landing, which it will define within a "natural" scale 
of human proportion (167). However, the technological precision of the plane 
occasions a shift in proportion away from the humanistic perception: 
Everything had changed its values seen from the air. Personality was 
outside the body, abstract. And one wished to be able to animate the 
heart, the legs1 the arms with it, to do which it would be necessary to be 
there, so as to collect; so as to give up this arduous gamel as one flies 
through the air, of assembling things that lie on the surface (17). 
In language that very closely parallels that of Gaudier-Brzeska, Woolf describes 
the extremely arduous task of "assembling things that lie on the surface," 
particularly from the air, because the position violates one's anthropocentric need 
to assemble perceptions according to a human scale of psychological depth. For 
Woolf, being in the air also produces a disturbing sensation of disembodiment, 
where the body's component parts do not "work" as they would normally. The 
11arduous game" she identifies, where one's own "personality" exists outside the 
body, reflects a modernist ideal of impersonality where having a personality or 
personal feelings allows one to "know what it means to want to escape from these 
things" (Eliot 43). However, unlike the work of Eliot or Gaudier-Brzeska, the goal 
of Woolf's "arduous game" and its corresponding anti-humanism, is precisely to re-
humanize a world that, in its self-absorption, has lost its humanizing perspective. 
Both Gaudier-Brzeska and Woolf, whether explicitly or implicitly, 
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understand emotion as it presents or displays itself on a "surface." While Gaudier-
Brzeska often uses the word "plane" in tandem with surface, these surfaces are 
by no means flat or dimensionless. Rather, as Woolf suggests in "Flying over 
London/' a surface is composed of things that have been strategically assembled 
in a way that transcends the humanistic desire for one's surroundings to reflect 
the self. Eve Sedgwick's use of the term "texture/' in Touching Feeling: Affect, 
Performativity, Pedagogy, best describes the kind of assembly Woolf invokes 
in the threesomes of "Street Haunting" and in her view from the airplane. For 
Sedgwick, this idea of texture is one way of looking beyond the logic of "depth or 
hidd~~ness, typically followed by a drama of exposure that has been such a staple 
of cnt1cal work for the last four decades" (8). This description corresponds both to 
the term I have opted to use throughout this essay, "psychology," and to Altieri 's 
notion of a "romantic expressivist" identity. According to Sedgwick, the idea of 
texture evokes a number of physical scales, which include both the sense of touch 
and visuality, where the perceived object is "sedimented, extruded, laminated, 
granulated, polished, distressed, felted or fluffed up" (15). Similarly, textural 
perception is highly empathic, for it means "to know or hypothesize whether a 
thing will be easy or hard, safe or dangerous to grasp, to stack, to fold, to shred, 
to climb on, to stretch, to slide, to soak 11 (14). Here, Sedgwick describes an almost 
telepathic means of engaging with the objects that is primarily phenomenological; 
to apprehend the object one must empathize intensely with its surface not its 
imagined depths. ' 
. In mod~rnist terms, this aspect of perceiving texture corresponds to 
Gaud1er-Brzeska s concept of "structural feeling" (Blast 155). For Gaudier-
Brzeska, . the French trenches epitomize texture, sculpturally crystallizing 
!he e~ot1onal resonances and residues of war, which explains his letter's 
1mmed1a~e procla~ation: "Written From The Trenches" (Memoir 27). Similarly, 
the emotional registers of Woolf's 11Street Haunting 11 follow the specific processes 
of textural perception Sedgwick identifies, by creating visual and verbal texture 
through experimentation with shifting technologies of scale. Inherent to Woolf's 
understandi~g of the textural social fabric is the emotional register such texture 
creates, which she evokes through images of various threesomes ballasted 
together in a common network of support. For Woolf, texture arises more from 
relati?n than sensation; much like Eliot's or Guadier-Brzeska's crystallized 
emotional concentrate. The texture of the social situations Woolf describes 
~evelops fro~ a form of relationality that distinguishes the individual only through 
literal connection to others. The dwarf appears only in the proximity of her cohorts 
~nd the blind men appear only through the support of the young boy. It is als~ 
1mpo~ant to n~te that Woolf's most intense textural perception occurs from the 
cockpit of an airplane, an image that later, with the impending human disaster of 
World War II, becomes a haunting symbol of technological indifference and mass 
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murder in texts such as Between the Acts ( 1941) -embodying the threat of Nazi 
violence that would hasten her eventual suicide. Likewise, Eliot's concentrated 
trace of impersonal emotion exists only within a multi-dimensional aesthetic 
network that dictates the poet's surrender of himself to a greater medium. This 
medium is itself a texture, as is reflected most clearly in Eliot's decision to term 
poetic works "monuments," literal sculptures carved by the impersonal addition of 
the new ("Tradition" 38). 
In theorizing forms of emotion that transcend individual psychology by 
moving beyond a "topos of depth or hiddeness followed by a drama of exposure/' 
(Sedgwick 9) these texts also outline a phenomenological relation as Jean-Paul 
Sartre defines it, which gets "rid of the dualism which in the existent opposes 
interior to exterior."18 Yet as various scholars have observed, including Dean and 
Ellmann, the progressive possibilities of these impersonal formulations are always 
unstable. On one hand, what we see from Gaudier-Brzeska's fascist leanings 
is that erasing the duality between subject and object can be a dangerous and 
ethically bankrupt procedure, as the subject can end up subsuming the object 
(or vice versa) in violent annihilation. On the other, Woolfs affectionately drawn 
trios simultaneously suggest that a phenomenological perspective might more 
ethically replace relationships of depth, which depend on the opposition of interior 
to exterior, with relations of breadth, or, in the terminology of this essay, surface. 
Such a perspective assaults the Cartesian tradition and its impulse, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, "to disengage from the object" (198). 
An impersonal understanding of emotional relations, in keeping with T.S. 
Eliot's imperative that emotion is neither conscious nor deliberate, "runs counter 
to the reflective procedure which detaches subject and object."19 To move beyond 
"anthropological association" means to move beyond the ego, psychology, and 
personality to an emotionally invested impersonal relation that "discover[s] the 
origin of the object at the very center of our experience" (Merleau-Ponty 71 ). We 
can see this relationship in modernist texts as they explore how the collapse of 
subject and object, inside and outside, might structure our emotional exp~rienc~. 
While figures such as Gaudier-Brzeska and Lewis demonstrate how this logic 
might support authoritarian fantasies, in Woolf's texts, the same model grounds 
relations of care, intimacy, and love. Ultimately, the ideals of emotion these texts 
present run counter to our assumptions about emotion, leading us to wonder about 
the practical, ethical, or theoretical reasons safeguarding emotion as a private 
phenomenon predicated upon the individual. But as Eliot's "Tradition and the 
Individual Talent" makes clear, the aim of "poetic emotion" is not to blot out the 
individuat but rather to dialectically transform "personal emotion" into a different 
medium altogether, albeit one that preserves the trace of individual differe~ce . . 
This is not to say that the expression of individual emotions is 
unimportant or politically useless and insipid. Charles Altieri, for example, 
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argues that the expression of emotions grants political being and voice to those 
who might otherwise be overlooked: "If we do not heed even the impulse for 
careful articulation of individual feelings, we deprive ourselves of basic resources 
that orient us toward hearing what matters to other people" (Particulars 12). In 
pa~icular,1 Altie.r~ emphasize.s ho~ the "articulation of individual feelings," might 
ra~1~ ones pol1t1cal and social existence, and this is a very compelling point. As 
critical components of our process of identity formation and individual narratives 
of selfhood, emotions are both the result of and an explanation for the social 
cont~xt~ in ~hie~ .we operate. While this understanding of emotion is certainly 
crucial in maintaining the dignity of selfhood and in acknowledging the claims of 
others, it is possible to imagine an emotion that serves the same function - that 
allows us to hear "what matters to other people" - without positing the individual 
as the repository of feeling and identity. Furthermore, it is possible to theorize 
~mot!onal con~ections and bonds that do not rest upon shared experience and 
1dent1ty. Despite the flaws, contradictions, and instability of their formulations, 
the modern.ists I ha~e discussed attempted to work through these possibilities by 
understanding emotion as an aesthetic practice. 
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Notes 
1 Lewis also contends that: 
If they were subsequently watched in the act of 11expressing" 
their "personality," it would be found that it was somebody else's 
personality they were expressing. If a hundred of them were 
observed "expressing their personality," all together and at the same 
time, it would be found that they all 11expressed" this inalienable, 
mysterious 11personality" in the same way. In short, it would be 
patent at once that they only had one personality between them 
to "express"-some "expressing" it with a little more virtuosity, 
some a little less. It would be a group personality that they were 
"expressing"-a pattern imposed on them by means of education 
and the hypnotism of cinema, wireless, and press. Each one would, 
however, be firmly persuaded that it was "his own" personality that 
he was "expressing": just as when he voted he would be persuaded 
that it was the vote of a free man that was being cast, replete with the 
independence and free-will which was the birthright of a member of a 
truly democratic community (148). 
7 See 'The 'Homo' the Child of the 'Suffragette,"' in The Art of Being Ruled 218. 
3 I make an implicit association here between this inexpressible ideal of emotion and the 
idea of the "sublime" as articulated by thinkers such as Kant and Longinus. While this 
connection is definitely plausible, the scope of this article does not permit me to explore it 
in detail. Perhaps a point for further inquiry into modernist emotion is its theoretical and 
historical relation to theories of the sublime. 
4 I am much indebted to Tim Dean and his graduate seminar on "Poetic lmpersonalitt 
for many of my thoughts about impersonality. See his essay ''T.S. Eliot, Famous 
Clairvoyante" which appears in Gender, Desire, and Sexuality in T. S. Eliot. As Laity 
suggests in her introduction to the book, the essays in the collection go beyond the 
"polarized versions" of the poet that have led to his critical repudiation and sequestering 
as the "oppressor" of all things progressive (5, 7). Other essays of note in this collection 
include Colleen Lamos's "The Love Song of T.S. Eliot: Elegaic Homoeroticism in the 
Early Poetry," and Charles Altieri 's "Theorizing Emotions in Eliot's Poetry and Poetics." 
Altieri's essay is of extreme importance to my argument; however, it does not link 
emotion explicitly to Eliot's theory of impersonality nor does it extend the genealogy of 
impersonality beyond Eliot. For one of the only studies that does read impersonality 
outside of Yeats, Eliot, or Pound, see Daniel Albright's Personality and Impersonality: 
Lawrence, Woolf, and Mann. 
·
5 I am not mentioning this omission as a flaw or oversight in Altieri's work but as a more 
general absence in the critical historicization of both impersonality and emotion. In 
fact, in "Theorizing Emotions in Eliot's Poetry and Poetics," Altieri openly admits to the 
limitations of his work by announcing his "worry that it will be too easy to dismiss my 
arguments as too abstract" (168). However, Altieri grants himself immunity by arguing 
that his abstraction allows him to separate "the thinking on affect within Eliot's work 
from three specific charges regularly leveled against him" (168). These charges are, 
according to Altieri "that all of Eliot's ideas are contaminated by the politics they so 
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seamlessly supported, that Eliot's very concern for unified sensibility makes him an 
anachronism in a postmodern culture now able to thrive on contraction and multiplicity, 
and that Eliot was simply aggrandizing his own imaginary identity in his laments about 
dissociated sensibility as a historical crisis" (168). 
6 Warren I. Susman's classic essay, 11'Personality' and the Making of Twentieth-Century 
Culture" establishes 11personality" as an explicit cultural and historical term in early 
twen.tieth-century America. According to Susman, this shift from a 11culture of character 
to a culture of personality" rested on a 11spiritual vision" of self-realization, new discourses 
of sociology and psychology, and the rise of self-help culture. Whereas one is born 
with the seeds of character, which can then grow or develop, personality must be built. 
Thus, says Susman, personality warranted a host of descriptors: "fascinating, stunning, 
attractive, magnetic, glowing, masterful, creative, dominant, forceful" (italics in original; 
218). According to Susman, such words distinguish 11personality" from 11character," which 
was generally defined in terms of good or bad. For Susman, 11personality" addresses the 
importance of 11being different, special, unusual, of standing out in the crowd" yet likeable 
at the same time (218). He observes that in America, the possession of personality 
became a prerequisite for successful political leadership and social authority. One can 
then assume that the meaning of personality circulates around distinction, spatial fixity, 
and forms of social demarcation. 
7 Jameson's A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present pinpoints the 
individual as a key feature in the 11classical celebration of modernity," which invokes 
individuality as an 11 illicit representation of consciousness as such" (54). Jameson's 
maxim, and what appears to be that of both Eliot and Lewis, is that 11the narrative of 
modernity cannot be organized" around such categories of consciousness, subjectivity, 
and individualism (55). In mounting a tradition that 11cannot be organized around 
categories of subjectivity," Eliot further subverts the rhetoric of humanism by fracturing 
the very ideal of modernity that grounds Jameson's critique: one that builds subjectivity 
around an imagined and nostalgic relation to the past. 
8 M. Merleau-Ponty uses the term 11anthropological association" to refer to a space 
oriented around the notion that humans possess a 11depth 11 or 11 interior' not granted to the 
objects surrounding them (101 ). 
9 Moreover, the wide critical reception of ideas of performance and performativity, most 
famously articulated by Judith Butler in Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter: On the 
Discursive Limits of "Sex" led to an understanding of emotional behaviors as performed 
only within the matrix of social intelligibility. Consequently, the idea of emotions 
themselves, generally attributed to a logic of origin and telos, slid onto the backburner of 
theoretical conversation. 
10 See, for example Teresa Brennan's The Transmission of Affect, Eva Feder Kittay's 
Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency; Lauren Berlant's collection 
lntim_ac~, an? Saidiya V. Hartman's Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Se/f-
Makmg m Nmeteenth-Century America. 
11 
In general, I am deeply indebted to Dean for many of my thoughts about modernist 
ideals of impersonality. 
12 I credit Joanna Gill for noting in her 111My Sweeney, Mr. Eliot'": Anne Sexton and the 
'Impersonal Theory of Poetry"' Eliot's apology for his 11juvenile" tone in 11Tradition and the 
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Individual Talent," which appeared in his preface to the 1964 edition to The Use of Poetry 
and the Use of Criticism: Studies in the Relation of Criticism to Poetry in England. 
13ln wrongly attempting to distinguish Eliot's interest in poetry 11that begins with self-
expression," Ellman includes this quotation in The Poetics of Impersonality as suggestive 
of Pound's lack of interest in the 11experiencing subject" and his focus on the 11kinetic 
power that his feelings represent (168). 
14 The kind of emotion I am detailing here reflects the vorticism of Ezra Pound and 
Wyndham Lewis in publications such as Blast I where the vortex perfects, edits, 
concentrates, and organizes the feminine excess of culture. 
15 In Beyond Sexuality, Tim Dean elaborates an impersonal form of desire that exists 
beyond psychology. This claim follows his project of 11outmoding the individual as a 
tenable category of analysis," whose subjectivity exists separately from the 11public realm 
of social life" (1 ). 
16 For an interesting essay on this text, see Marysa Demoor's "From Epitaph to Obituary: 
The Death Politics of T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound" which argues that both Eliot and Pound 
wrote memorials to dead men that served to 11enshrine and encapsulate" their own 
achievements (254). 
11Woolf s reference to the 11angles and relationships" of observation parallels Eliot's 
assessment of impersonal form in the 'Tradition and the Individual Talent," where 
the emergence of the new modifies the existing order of art, 11and so the relations, 
proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted" (38). The 
similarity here suggests that Eliot also understands the value of atmosphere. 
18 See chapter three. 11Phenomenology," of Sartre's Basic Writings. Similarly, in line with 
Sedgwick, Tim Dean's Beyond Sexuality espouses the ideal of experiencing social and 
sexual relations horizontally rather than vertically in his notion of 11[e]cological thinking," 
which considers how human relations work within networks of cause and effect (155). 
19 Merleau-Ponty also makes clear that the blurring of subject and object erases the idea 
of a specific bottom and a top: 
But what meaning could the word 'against' have for a subject 
not placed by his body face to face with the world? It implies the 
distinction of a top and a bottom, or an 11oriented space." When 
I say that an object is on a table, I always mentally put myself 
either in the table or in the object, and I apply to them a category 
which theoretically fits the relationship of my body to external 
objects. Stripped of the anthropological association, the word on is 
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